

The Bush Doctrine

By

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President Bush's "National Security Strategy" was published in *The New York Times* yesterday; it will soon be called, I imagine, the "Bush Doctrine." Several previous American presidents have hankered after carving their names in history in this way. There is, of course, a more serious aspect than self-promotion to a statement of this kind. Several of the more recent of our leaders have tried to bring a sense of order into the actions of their administrations by grouping them under a grand, overall summary. Since such statements both reveal their thinking and codify at least some of their actions -- thoughts and actions which will affect our lives for years in many and probably unexpected ways -- a policy statement of this kind deserves to be examined very carefully.

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I approach the task of examining the Bush Doctrine from having participated in a comparable attempt to bring order into the Kennedy administration. At that time, the Policy Planning Council experimented with ways both to energize what we newcomers regarded as a rather stodgy bureaucracy and to prevent the separate departments of government from pursuing conflicting policies. Let me take a slight detour to describe this earlier venture since it sets both my perspective on the current declaration, and, explains a part of the reason for President Bush having authorized it.

In 1961, we found that each government department had what amounted to a "foreign office." If you had examined the roster of any American embassy, you would have found that the handful of Foreign Service Officers was vastly outnumbered by representatives of other departments and agencies. Even the Department of the Interior had overseas programs run by its personnel who were pursuing objectives in a surprising array of countries.

Bringing the departments together on a common approach to our aims proved to be an awesome task. When we assembled senior representatives of each, we quickly found that they came as "ambassadors" for their departments to put forward their separate policies. The Department of Agriculture wanted one thing; the Treasury another; and so on. Each pursuing its own objectives, none was much interested in any concept of a national policy.

A personal example: when I became head of the Algerian Task Force, I saw that we had no hope of achieving any of our objectives there unless we could reverse this procedure. The trick was how to do it.

What I did was to run a sort of seminar. I got everyone from all over the government with an interest in Algeria and France (since the war was still raging between

them) together in one room. Then, with the help of the intelligence “community,” I got us first to agree on what had happened and what appeared likely to happen. On the basis of that shared “appreciation” as the intelligence people called the consensus, I then asked what our objective in the country was. Each group put forward its aim. Many were trivial; some were impossible. Finally, we narrowed to what was essential. In Algeria it was fairly simple. We wanted, first, for the French and Algerians to end their war as painlessly as possible (particularly to prevent what the CIA then thought likely, the precipitous flight of a million or so Europeans and perhaps even more of their local allies) and, second, for the incoming Algerian political leadership to form as constructive a government as possible and one that was not hostile to us.

Both of these objectives were obviously going to be difficult to achieve. The Franco-Algerian war was violent and “dirty.” Climaxing over a century of humiliation, repression, torture, terror and mass executions, the last months and particularly the last weeks of the war were the most horrible I had then seen. In the final week of the war, we were told that some 16,000 Europeans (many were not actually French but Maltese, Spaniards and others who were known as *pieds noirs*) disappeared, probably killed by the Algerians after having been identified by the French themselves as particularly violent and unwanted people. Hatreds ran deep. To me, the “climate” of Algeria was brought home most vividly when we discovered that at Algiers’s big children’s hospital, which then housed hundreds of wounded and sick young people, the French head pediatrician had planted mines to blow up his patients.

The war had become three-sided: the French army, the Algerian “internal” or guerrilla armed forces and the dissident European *Organisation Armée Secrète* (“Secret Army Organization”). The French would not share information with us; we had no contacts at all with the Secret Army Organization; and our contacts with the Algerians were sporadic and limited. So to some extent we had to fly blind. But it was clear that terror was the order of the day.

It was not only terror, bad as that was, but also the lack of experience, training and overall “capacity” on the Algerian side that was disturbing. Although Algiers had the largest French medical college, we found that only five – yes, 5 -- Algerians were trained doctors. All through the society similar deficiencies were evident. As Europeans began to leave, it was impossible even to get a shirt washed because they had monopolized all the laundries. And so on. Clearly, a huge task awaited in whatever one might hope would be a degree of “peace.”

We wanted to find some way to help move toward peace but were constrained by several obstacles. First, we had almost no money for any sort of program since Algeria had not been considered when the AID budget was made up. Second, the French government was jealous of its role and looked with a jaundiced eye at anything we thought of doing. Third, since we had supplied the arms and munitions with which the French had been killing them, the Algerians were not exactly overwhelmed with affection for us. Then, right in Washington, we faced the fourth obstacle: the American

government was deeply, almost bitterly, divided. It was that fourth obstacle I had to try first to overcome.

As Algeria had been legally a *département* (roughly: a province) of France, American relations with it, limited as they were, fell bureaucratically under the State Department's Bureau of European Affairs while the emerging independent country of Algeria would have to be handed over to the Bureau of African Affairs. The responsible officers of each Bureau almost literally spoke different languages and certainly were marching to the beat of different drummers. Beyond this inner core, the key officers of the other departments, Defense, the CIA, AID, Agriculture and, as I said, even Interior, were pushing separate agendas and lacked the personal relations that I had already learned made government function. They certainly had no interest in one another's positions. The fellow from Agriculture knew that his career depended on what his superiors in that Department thought of him; not how he got along with the men from AID or Defense or what he did in the task force.

What I set out to do was to force the members of the task force to change direction – rather than setting forth their separate policies to us, I argued, their task was to take back to their departments the consensus of our group. They were to explain to their colleagues our general aims – what began to emerge as a national policy -- and find within their separate organizations the means to achieve them.

For Algeria, this proved a herculean task. It also proved to be a general condition for every aspect of foreign affairs. So the Policy Planning Council took over the job of trying to use what we were doing as a model.

As it developed, the model grew into a sort of policy “pyramid.” At the base was a series of studies, codified as papers, on major or “strategic” countries (mine included, among others, Turkey and Egypt). These were then grouped by areas to account for extra-national or regional issues. Then, at least theoretically, at the apex was to be a grand, overarching statement of policy which would set out our national priorities and the means to achieve them.

The papers were written, but their effect was less than we had hoped because few government departments were willing to accept outside guidance, the President was not willing to force them to do so and we tended to focus on the grand ideas rather than the means to effect them. For the fact that the government could not work as a unit, we paid a considerable price in, among other places, Vietnam.

Allow me a moment on Vietnam: our central policy had to aim at making South Vietnam politically viable. There was no other way except defeat that we could hope to get out of the “quagmire.” But at least a few of us who looked at Vietnam soon observed two fatal flaws in what we were doing (or not doing): on the one hand, we had no overall sense of what guerrilla warfare was and, on the other, it was evident that that what we were doing with the right hand we often negated or thwarted with the left.

These are significant today because there is a danger that we are more or less repeating history. Let me briefly explain. First on the nature of guerrilla warfare:

Guerrilla warfare, like terrorism, is not primarily a matter of force and violence. It is composed of three elements: politics, administration and force. Analyzing Vietnam, I came to the conclusion, as we then affected to do mathematically, that it was 80% political. That aspect of the guerrilla war had been won by the Viet Minh coalition led by the Communists by the time the French gave up in 1954. I say “coalition” because the principal motivation of the Viet Minh was not Communism but nationalism (as it is almost everywhere in our times). The Vietnamese were fighting *against* French imperialism more than *for* Communism.

Based on their victory over the French, the Viet Cong (as they came to be known) began to organize not only their (northern) territory, which they totally controlled, but also most of the south which was theoretically controlled by the state the French sponsored. The Viet Cong ran the schools, hospitals, selected local officials, collected taxes and even sold war bonds. By roughly 1957, the Viet Cong had won the administrative aspect of the war. It had become impossible for the French-installed South Vietnamese government even to move its personnel outside the three or four major cities.

Administration together with politics amounted, I estimated, to about 95% of the overall potential of guerrilla warfare. All that remained, when we began to get into the war in the early 1960s was the residual 5% -- the short end of the stick – military force.

As I waded through the vast literature we were producing on Vietnam, I found no evidence that we ever understood even the concept of guerrilla war. My model or blueprint may not have been perfect, but it was the only one in town. No one else had ever bothered to try to construct one. Consequently, we were fighting blind.

Based on my study, I predicted in a 1963 speech at the U.S. National War College that we would lose the war. My audience of generals, admirals, colonels and navy captains was furious. They were sure they could win. America always did. And they were anxious to get about it. Any other idea was simply cowardly or unpatriotic. I was lucky not to be lynched. When, some years later, I made a similar speech, again at the War College, I tried to protect myself by saying that I intended to be provocative. An army general got up at the end and asked why I had made that disclaimer. The audience, he said, completely agreed with what I had said. They had been there. It was a very expensive learning process.

Other than the lack of a blueprint or concept of guerrilla warfare, we were thwarted by the way we tried to deal with the war. We approached it, as we did all other issues, massively but without an overall sense of what we were doing: Each “arm” of our vast government did what it knew how to do and what it had the resources to do. The army fought; the AID people gave supplies; the intelligence people gathered information, etc. Usually, since the officers were neither fools or knaves, what they were doing was perfectly sensible viewed from their separate perspectives. Consider the part AID played.

AID naturally sought to help the South Vietnamese recover from the battles, to improve the quality of their lives and so to “win their hearts and minds” by providing food and supplies. The AID administrators quickly realized that they could not do these things if corrupt Vietnamese officials stole the food and supplies. (My former student Neil Sheehan brilliantly illustrates this in his study of the life of John Paul Vann, *A Bright Shining Lie*.) To get around the corrupt Vietnamese, American personnel began to deliver aid direct to the villagers. The American officials were honest so the food got to the villagers all right, but the villagers, naturally, identified the Americans as their “government.” In their minds, we had replaced the French. The government of the South did not figure in their thought. So, with the best of intentions and impeccable logic, our representatives undercut our essential objective, enabling the south to survive as a coherent political unit.

Every administration struggles, at least in its early days, with the problems of definition of challenges and coordination of efforts to meet them. This is how I read President Bush’s “National Security Strategy” paper. It aims, as a great medieval philosopher put it, “to turn faces all in the same direction.” From my own experience and my study of history, I begin then with great sympathy for the Bush statement. Now I turn to an examination of it and the way it is “fleshed out” in other statements.

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Implicit in the paper and other statements are answers to fundamental questions. As I see the questions they are:

- 1) What is the American national interest?
- 2) How is this national interest to be enhanced and protected?
- 3) What does the Bush Doctrine define as the challenge to that national interest?
- 4) What is being proposed to counter that challenge?
- 5) What are the chances of success of the proposed actions?
- 6) How does what is proposed accord with other aspects of our national purpose or style?
- 7) How does the planned action mesh with accepted international standards of law?
- 8) Will the planned action win approval of those allies, friends and even enemies whose approval or at least acquiescence we need?

Not all of these crucial issues are addressed in the paper, but I will draw upon it and other documents to address them.

1) The National Security Strategy paper begins, as almost every statement of government policy does, by affirming the high-minded objective of America: a world safe for democracy. While the paper does not explicitly say so, the implication is that our fundamental national interest is the preservation of our freedom and prosperity.

2) The paper argues that “freedom, democracy, and free enterprise” are not so much, or at least not only, an ideal but themselves constitute a practical program since “only nations that share a commitment to protecting basic human rights and guaranteeing political and economic freedom will be able to unleash the potential of their people and assure their future prosperity.” In short, it follows that our beliefs are themselves the “engines” that promote well-being; those who do not embody them in action will lag behind or fail. Implicit is the idea that like-minded nations will create a world “climate” in which the kind of life we wish to lead can survive.

However, in a generally hostile world such a world “climate” is and will be threatened. Since America has “unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence,” it has “the duty of protecting those values against their enemies...” This is not a new task but “is the common calling of freedom-loving people across the globe and across the ages.”

Up to this point the statement might have been promulgated by any American government in the past century: America had been proclaimed to have a “Manifest Destiny,” with the obligation to “Make the World Safe for Democracy” and to create a world peace under which all nations could live safely “within their own boundaries...in freedom from fear and want...” America has been seen to have both a unity of interest with peoples everywhere and also a duty to lead them toward what we believe to be the right goal.

3) At this point, the paper begins to diverge from previous policy statements in significant ways. Dangers in the past, the paper points out, occurred from rival nation-states so “Enemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to endanger America.” Rival nations, it asserts, are no longer the danger: “Now shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank. Terrorists are organized to penetrate open societies and to turn the power of modern technologies against us.” This is what the Bush Doctrine sees as the challenge.

That challenge “lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology.” While “radicalism” is not spelled out in the paper, other statements make it clear that the Bush administration has redefined it from Communism to Islam. Technology is to be taken as an all-encompassing word for “weapons of mass destruction” and particularly for nuclear bombs. “Our enemies,” the paper asserts, “have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination.”

At this point, one must pause to ask questions as one should have asked when we got into the Vietnam war.

The first question is whether “terrorists” are a single group or even a single category of people. As I have pointed out in a previous essay, this is certainly not the case. I identify several categories of “terrorists.”

The first category is made up of pathological, violence-prone people who act because they are boiling with rage. Such people exist on the fringes of every society. They (including Americans) have perpetrated some of the most spectacular acts of terrorism. Such people need to be identified and removed from society. Doing so is essentially a medical and police function.

The second category is made up of people who or may or may not be sane but who engage in crime for the monetary rewards they hope to get. They have not, at least so far, committed large-scale or dramatic acts of terror, but they have harmed our society far more than those we think of as terrorists: the provision of drugs has done our society immense harm. The drug trade is not new. As practiced by the British, it nearly destroyed Chinese society a century ago. In the hands of the Mafia and mafia-like organizations, it has shattered hundreds of thousands of lives, caused Americans to incarcerate an unprecedented number of our fellow citizens and cost us hundreds of billions of dollars. The worst may yet be to come. Looming in the future is the possibility that, in their quest for money, mafia-type organizations will also become peddlers of weapons of mass destruction. Dealing with them is essentially a police function.

Quite separate from these two groups are those who act for political motives. They too fall into two categories. The first is composed of those who, like the *al-Qaida* organization are attempting to disrupt, overturn or reorder their own societies and to strike out at those they believe are thwarting their efforts. *Al-Qaida* is noteworthy not only because it has managed to pull off a spectacular attack but also because it has managed to enlist like-minded people not only in Africa and Asia but even in Europe and the United States and because it has found a ready-made ideology in religious fundamentalism. Its religious fundamentalism is based on Islam, but groups with comparable ideas and motivations -- some of whom have also committed spectacular violent acts -- are found also among Christians, Hindus and Jews. It is by no means certain that any kind of alien police or military action will prove effective against them; history shows that as each generation is beaten down or killed, a new generation will replace the old. Arguably, even though such action is only temporarily successful, self-defense requires that it be undertaken. Over the longer term, the dissatisfactions that give birth to the movements must be addressed. Only if moderates within the same societies come believe that they can accomplish an acceptable minimum of the “reforms” they demanded will they rein in the radicals.

Finally, among those who engage in “violent politics” are the thwarted nationalists. They are quite a different set from the others. They also are widespread, occurring in territories controlled by China (the Tibetans and Uigurs), Russia (the Çeçans, Abkhazians, Turkomans, Tatars and others), Indonesia (the East Timorese and others), the Philippines (the Moros), Burma (the Karens and others), Sri Lanka (the

Tamils), India (the Kashmiris), Pakistan (the Pathans), Afghanistan (the Hazaras, Turcomans and Tajiks), Iran (the Kurds and Lurs), Iraq (the Kurds and Shi'is), Turkey (the Kurds), Israel (the Palestinians), Spain (the Basques), France (the Corsicans), England (the Irish) and many nations in Africa. These are just a few of those now active. Many others have been active and presumably even more will someday become active. Many of these we have favored in the past; some we still favor (calling them "freedom fighters") while others we oppose (calling them "terrorists").

It is important to recognize that, up to this time, practically none of the movements of national liberation directly impinges upon the United States; most are so far removed from us that few, even in our government, could describe them or identify their leaders.

What is significant (and beneficial to us) about these peoples is that they are struggling to join our "club." That is to say, they recognize that in the world today only those "count" or even have legal existence who combine nationhood (sometimes defined by religion, usually by language and always by neighborhood) with statehood.

To be stateless, which is their condition, in our world is literally to be an outlaw: being able to travel, acquiring a job, an education and medical care and expressing one's identity, speaking one's language or even practicing one's religion are all either difficult or impossible for many of them. Abuse of civil rights is common while recourse to justice is usually unattainable. As virtual outcasts, they have little stake in world order and peace.

There are, of course, varying degrees of deprivation: France's 5 million Muslims are far better off than many others; some like the Bosnians, the Dinkas, the Çeçens and the Marsh Arabs have been subjected to genocide; others like the Tibetans live under a harsh and suppressive regime; still others have been afflicted only to the extent of having their languages or religions discouraged or suppressed.

Some have fought back. The Irish, Zionist Jews, Palestinians, Algerians, Çeçens and Basques are examples of those who have. Fighting back is hard and requires special tactics: being unable to stand up against large, well-equipped armies, the "resisters" have generally used the weapon of the weak, terrorism. That is, they fought with whatever weapons they could acquire against whatever targets they could reach.

Lumping these diverse groups into a single category, the Bush Doctrine promises that "America will help nations that need our assistance in combating terror." Their leaders, quick to grasp this fact, have responded by saying that their regimes are our natural allies and that their Palestinians, Çeçens, Basques, Kashmiris and others are "our" terrorists; our war is their war too. This has allied us with some very unsavory and undemocratic regimes. It makes allies of those who do the suppressing or thwarting of the urge to become legal members of the world community.

The Bush Doctrine is thus a 180° turn from the policy first announced by our Founding Fathers, ringingly set forth at the end of the First World War (but only weakly and shortly pursued) by President Woodrow Wilson and reaffirmed by America at the end of the Second World War. Identification with the urge for the “self-determination of nations” made America the most beloved and respected country on Earth.

From other statements, it appears that the Bush Administration believes that all those who seek to upset the existing order in their countries or abroad are essentially the same breed, all “terrorists” and therefore our enemies. We must fight them all, because everywhere we look, we find enemies. And they intend to attack us: “Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination.”

This is the essence of the justification for the Bush Doctrine and so demands a sober, hard look. What is the evidence? Exactly whom is meant? What precisely is the danger? How real and how urgent is it. The meaning of “doing so with determination” is not clearly spelled out here or, as far as I have been able to find out, elsewhere. Failure to clearly and exactly analyze these issues is, as I have suggested above, responsible for the vast damage done to our country by the Vietnam War and explains in part the failure of American policy in Vietnam.

4) So what is proposed to deal with what the Bush Doctrine identifies as the challenge? The Bush Doctrine paper asserts that the task of “Defending our Nation against its enemies...has changed dramatically.” It spells out three means: for the United States and “countries cooperating with us” to a) “deny them [terrorists] sanctuary at every turn;” b) “build defenses against ballistic missiles and other means of delivery;” and c) “deny, contain, and curtail our enemies’ efforts to acquire dangerous technologies.”

What is meant by (a) (denying sanctuary) has already been demonstrated in Afghanistan and is beginning to become clear in the Philippines and Colombia; for “countries cooperating with us” is becoming clear in Palestine. The Bush Doctrine accepts Russia as “a partner in the war on terror” (for attempting to suppress the non-Russian nations it dominates). It has gone considerably further with Israel. Colombia, the Philippines, China and other countries have either been accepted or assert their membership in our coalition by attacking their “terrorists.”

I believe the chances of success for this part of the Bush Doctrine are very low for two reasons:

First, it is clear that the roster of nations seeking what Woodrow Wilson called “self-determination of peoples” is already very large, and, as education and material well-being increase, it is likely to grow. Unless America completely dominates the world, islands of resistance will remain.

Second, even after decades (or in the example of Çeçeniya, centuries) of repression, struggles for national liberation continue. Nowhere in modern times has

suppression been long successful. Resistance grows on repression. And history shows us that as communications improve, those struggling in one part of the world make common cause with those struggling elsewhere.

The second aspect of the Bush program (b) to “build defenses against ballistic missiles and other means of delivery” is, essentially, the so-called “Star Wars” program.

There are three so-far identified weaknesses in this program: first, so-far at least, Star Wars does not work; second, even if it did, it would be relatively cheap for a rival power to build more missiles while for us it would be relatively expensive (and unreliable) to build a larger “shield;” and, third, there are obvious, cheap and relatively easy means, other than missiles, to deliver weapons of mass destruction. Take one example: every year nearly 6 million containers arrive in American ports; only about 4% of these are examined by customs. Of course, more can be. But much of our commerce depends on the \$600 billion worth of goods they contain. More pointedly, few ships or aircraft can be minutely checked before arrival. Thus, cargoes of weapons of mass destruction could, without any increase in technology or any investment in missiles or aircraft, reach danger points well before there is any chance of detecting them.

Although these points are not addressed, the Bush Doctrine apparently reacts to this weakness by (c) spelling out a third activity: to “deny, contain, and curtail our enemies’ efforts to acquire dangerous technologies.”

Is this feasible? Denying others access to technologies was what we tried at the advent of the nuclear age. We jealously guarded the “secret” of the bomb. Of course, guarding “dangerous technologies” did not then work. It will not work now. Whatever secret there was has long since been made available in scientific publications and even in the popular press and on the internet. The only inhibitions to building nuclear weapons are cost and industrial capacity. Neither is likely to be effective in at least a score of countries. It is absolutely infeasible in regards to chemical and biological weapons. They require very little technology and no significant industrial capacity. I could make them in my garage.

Not addressed in the document but worth considering is that, apart from “technologies,” nuclear weapons might be acquired by theft, purchase or donation. One possibility is that the huge arsenal of the former Soviet Union might be pillaged by a dissident (die-hard Stalinist or neo-Nazi) group or a mafia-type organization which might then sell a weapon or weapons components abroad. Any one of a dozen regimes with the money to do so could then purchase these materials. For a billion dollars – cheap at the price – it could then join the nuclear club as India and Pakistan have recently done.

A second possibility arises: while not likely today, it is certainly conceivable that under different conditions one or other of the nuclear powers might give a weapon to another power. In fact, it has already happened. South Africa and France enabled Israel to acquire its nuclear start.

Let us be clear: as long as there are nuclear powers, the have-nots will have national interests that are almost certain to impel them, if they feel threatened, to do anything to acquire means to defend themselves. Against nuclear-armed powers, such means are likely to include nuclear weapons and almost certainly chemical and biological weapons.

In answer to this, the Bush Administration sets out the most radical of its policies, signaling its intention to preëemptively attack any country which it believes might acquire nuclear weapons. Three countries, which President Bush labeled “the axis of evil” – Iraq, Iran and North Korea – have so far been named. As the Doctrine puts it, “America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed.” That is, we will engage in “first strikes.”

This is a reversal of policies adopted by both Republican and Democratic administrations since the advent of the nuclear age. Since we know that these policies were carefully formulated and exhaustively considered, we must ask, first, if this radical change is necessary; second, if it is wise; and, third, if it is likely to be successful.

On the first point, is a change of policy necessary, the Bush Doctrine informs us that “Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination.”

Neither here nor elsewhere is any such evidence adduced. If it exists, the public has a right to know. And, as I point out in a previous essay (on August 18, 2002) on secrecy in government and my experience in the Cuba Missile Crisis, there is no compelling reason for such information, even if acquired by exotic means, to be withheld. In fact, there is substantial reason to believe that Iraq, the current suspect, is not even close to acquiring a single nuclear weapon. If this is wrong, the government has an obligation to prove it. If the danger does not exist, there is no necessity for such a radical and potentially enormously costly change in our policy.

On the second point, the wisdom of such a radical change of policy, there will be, of course, divergent opinions. But consider these points: from the perspective of other nations, America will be transformed into the world’s self-appointed policeman, acting as it chooses when it chooses against any country it targets. It follows, I believe, that the reservoir of good will that has always been one of our most important national treasures will quickly dry up. Even our European allies now show evidence of this change in their attitude toward us. Poorer and weaker countries will cringe in fear. And, as they change toward us, we will change not only toward them but toward one another. It will be increasingly hard for us to maintain the free and open society to protect which this very policy is to be adopted. In short, I conclude that the policy is very unwise.

The third consideration is whether such a policy can be successful. We certainly have the capability of invading and conquering any country in the world. But, unless we intend to conquer most of the world, it is the *threat* rather than the *act* that is crucial to the policy. The threat itself becomes more a part of the danger than of the solution:

regimes of which we disapprove will fear us. Their rulers will know that a “regime change” as we now propose for Iraq is their death warrant. So, unless they are suicidal, they will do all in their power to acquire means to deter us. This, after all, was our policy for half a century during the Cold War: keeping the Soviet Union at bay by making an attack ruinously expensive. It was logical for us and will be logical for others.

It seems to me that this is exactly the reverse of what our national interest requires: we should aim at reducing fear of attack by anyone – including us; we should aim at strengthening alternative means of action; we should aim at leading the world rather than bullying it; and we should recognize, as President Eisenhower so aptly put it that there is but one law for us and for them and not try to place ourselves above it.

Specifically, in the field of nuclear arms and delivery systems, in the area of chemical and biological weapons, and, even more fundamentally in the application of international law, we need to *lead* toward peace rather than *threaten* war. We need to identify the issues that threaten the peace and address those head-on. Lord knows, there are enough of these to keep us all busy. Work on them could be highly productive. Real progress on the Kashmir problem some years ago, for example, might have headed off the dangerous nuclear weapons programs of India and Pakistan.

These approaches are not adopted or even acknowledged in the Bush Doctrine. Rather, we are pulling away from programs designed by both Republican and Democratic administrations to limit or remove sources of danger. The Bush Administration has not only extended the time for mutual nuclear weapons reduction with Russia but has abrogated treaties designed to diminish the number of such weapons, delivery systems, testing and reduction of chemical and biological weapons. These moves make it more likely that weapons or the components of weapons can be stolen or bought and dispersed.

5) In summary, I believe that the Bush Doctrine will not work.

6) How does the Bush Doctrine accord with other aspects of our national purpose or style? As I have mentioned, in terms of security policy and relations with other countries, it is a radical departure.

More important, at least selfishly, is the impact the policy will have on our lives in America. Not spelled out in the paper, which dealt with foreign relations, I believe it is a move toward a garrison state in which the respect for law, civil liberties, tolerance, openness and trust that, to me at least, is the richness of our country will be eroded. As our Founding Fathers taught us, liberty is hard to win and easy to lose. What we do to others abroad will certainly affect what we do to one another at home.

7) How does the planned approach to the world mesh with accepted international standards of law? The answer is quite explicit. Attacking another country in a first strike, that is, acting “against...emerging threats before they are fully formed” or, bluntly, offensively rather than defensively, was specifically treated as a war crime in the Nuremberg trials and is banned in the Charter of the United Nations. (Article 2 ¶4). This article, which is, of course, embodied in a treaty passed by the U.S. Senate and so

has the force of law in America, enjoins governments to “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”

States do retain the right of self-defense but, as set forth in the United Nations Charter (Article 51) this right is only to be exercised in response to a prior armed attack and then only under the authority of the Security Council.

Preemptive attack, as called for in the Bush Doctrine and in messages to Congress and other public statements, would thus be a violation not only of international law but also of United States law.

8) Finally, will the planned action win approval of those allies, friends and even enemies whose approval or at least acquiescence we need? Of course, no one can be confident of the answer, but it is certainly already clear in Europe that the trend is against the Bush Doctrine (as it was against the Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt in 1956 and the Soviet attack on Hungary at the same time). As I have mentioned, such information as I get from the “Third World” suggests that the reaction is even more fearful and angry there. I believe that if action is actually taken under the Doctrine, it may cause major unrest and perhaps revolution in several African and Asian countries.

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In conclusion, I compliment the Bush Administration for making clear its intentions. That is what a government in a democracy owes those who elected it. The Bush Administration has honored that duty. But, I believe what is here (and elsewhere) spelled out as the policy to be pursued by the Administration is a radical ideology, very alien to the American tradition, one that is not well analyzed, a policy that will not succeed and, above all, one that is likely to do major damage to our country and to the world.

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